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Abstract
A number of studies have successfully developed speaker verifi-
cation or spoofing detection systems. However, studies integrat-
ing the two tasks remain in the preliminary stages. In this paper,
we propose two approaches for the integrated replay spoofing-
aware speaker verification task: an end-to-end monolithic and
a back-end modular approach. The first approach simultane-
ously trains speaker identification, replay spoofing detection,
and the integrated system using multi-task learning with a com-
mon feature. However, through experiments, we hypothesize
that the information required for performing speaker verifica-
tion and replay spoofing detection might differ because speaker
verification systems try to remove device-specific information
from speaker embeddings while replay spoofing exploits such
information. Therefore, we propose a back-end approach us-
ing a deep neural network that takes speaker embeddings ex-
tracted from enrollment and test utterances and a replay de-
tection prediction on the test utterance as input. Experiments
are conducted using the ASVspoof 2017-v2 dataset, which in-
cludes official trials on the integration of speaker verification
and replay spoofing detection. The proposed back-end approach
demonstrates a relative improvement of 21.77% in terms of the
equal error rate for integrated trials compared to a conventional
speaker verification system.
Index Terms: integrated speaker verification, replay spoofing
detection, presentation attack detection, speaker verification,
deep neural networks
1. Introduction
Recent advances in deep neural networks (DNNs) have im-
proved the performance of speaker verification (SV) systems,
including short duration and far-field scenarios [1–5]. However,
SV systems are known to be vulnerable to spoofing attacks such
as replay attacks, voice conversion, and speech synthesis. These
vulnerabilities have inspired research into presentation attack
detection (PAD), which classifies given utterances as spoofed
or not spoofed [6–8]; notably, many DNN-based systems have
achieved promising results [9–11].
Table 1 demonstrates the vulnerability of conventional SV
systems when faced with replay attacks. The performance is
reported using the three types of equal error rates (EERs) de-
scribed in Table 2 [12]. Table 2 shows the target and non-
target trials for calculating the EER, and is represented by 1
and 0, respectively. Zero-effort (ZE)-EER describes the con-
ventional SV performance without the presence of replay at-
tacks. PAD-EER denotes the errors of replay attack detection.
Integrated (Int)-EER describes overall performance, including
both ZE and replayed non-target trials. Hereafter, we refer to
“replay spoofing-aware SV as an integrated speaker verification
(ISV) task and report its performance using Int-EER. Results
∗ Equal contribution
† Corresponding author
Table 1: Difference in EER according to the existence of re-
play non-target trials. Results demonstrate the vulnerability of
speaker verification systems unaware of replay spoofing attacks.
ZE-EER PAD-EER Int-EER
SV baseline 9.58 33.72 19.98
Table 2: Three types of EERs reported in this paper. Enroll-
ment utterance is always bona-fide. Target: enroll and test ut-
terances are uttered by an identical speaker and are bona-fide,
ZE non-target: enroll and test utterance are uttered by different
speakers and are bona-fide, Replay non-target: enroll and test
utterances are uttered by an identical speaker and test utterance
is replay spoofed.
Target ZE Replaynon-target non-target
ZE-EER 1 0
PAD-EER 1 0
Int-EER 1 0 0
show that the EER degrades to 33.72% with replayed utter-
ances; this fatal performance degradation supports the necessity
of a spoofing-aware ISV system. In this paper, PAD includes
replay attacks only as the official integrated trials of PAD and
ASV are provided for ASVspoof2017 which cover replay at-
tacks only.
While a number of studies have worked to develop indepen-
dent systems for SV and PAD, few have sought to integrate the
SV and PAD systems [12–17]. More specifically, this handful of
studies proposed approaches such as cascaded, parallel [12,13],
and joint systems [14, 16, 17]. Most existing studies use com-
mon features to integrate the two tasks for system efficiency.
Section 2 further takes up this existing body of work.
In this study, we propose two spoofing-aware frameworks
for the ISV task, illustrated in Figure 1. The first proposed
framework expands existing work by proposing a monolithic
end-to-end (E2E) architecture. More specifically, it conducts
speaker identification (SID) and PAD to train a common feature
using multi-task learning (MTL) [18]. Concurrently, it uses the
embeddings to compose trials and conduct the ISV task. Using
the sum of SID, PAD, and ISV losses, the entire DNN is jointly
optimized. However, based on tendencies observed during in-
ternal experiments, we hypothesize that training a common fea-
ture for the ISV task may not be ideal because the properties
required for each task differ: the PAD task representation uses
device and channel information while SV need to remove it (this
is further discussed in Section 3).
Based on our hypothesis, we propose a novel modular ap-
proach using a separate DNN. This approach inputs two speaker
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Figure 1: (a): An end-to-end architecture that trains embeddings (used for speaker identification and spoofing detection) and ISV
concurrently, (b): A separate architecture that inputs speaker embeddings and spoofing detection results and outputs the ISV result.
embeddings (for enroll and test each) and a PAD prediction to
make the ISV decision. It adopts a two-phase approach. In the
first phase, the speaker identifier and PAD system are trained
separately. In the second phase, speaker embeddings are ex-
tracted from a pretrained speaker identifier [19], and the em-
beddings and PAD predictions results are fed to a separate DNN
module. Using this framework, we achieved a 21.77% relative
improvement in terms of Int-EER.1
The contributions of this paper are:
1. Propose a novel E2E framework which jointly optimizes
SID, PAD, and the ISV task
2. Experimentally validate the hypothesis that the discrimi-
native information required for the SV and the PAD task
may be distinct, requiring separate front-end modeling
3. Propose a separate modular back-end DNN which takes
speaker embeddings and PAD predictions as input to
make ISV decision
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
details related work on the integrated system of ASV and PAD.
Section 3 introduces the two proposed frameworks. Section 4
presents our experiments and results and the paper is concluded
in Section 5.
2. Related work
In this section, we introduce the two studies most relevant to
this study [12, 16, 17]. Firstly, Todisco et. al. [12] proposed a
separate modelling of two Gaussian back-end systems with a
unified threshold for both SV and PAD tasks. This study ex-
plored various acoustic features to find which ones best simul-
taneously suited both tasks. As organizers of the ASVspoof
challenges, official trials for the ISV task were released in this
study. For our purposes, it is important to highlight that these
trials include both ZE and replayed non-target, which we used
throughout this paper. However, Todisco et. al. [12] reported
the average of two EERs, ZE-EER and PAD-EER, because they
separately modeled two Gaussian mixture models for each task.
Meanwhile, Li et. al. [16, 17] extended Todiscos work [12]
by proposing an integrated ISV system, which was the first
study to report an Int-EER. More specifically, they proposed
a three-phase training framework for extracting an embedding
for the ISV task, followed by a probabilistic linear discrimi-
nant analysis (PLDA) back-end. In the first phase, MTL [18]
was employed to train a common embedding for both SV and
PAD tasks. In the second and third phases, the embedding was
1https://www.asvspoof.org/index2017.html
adapted to fit the ISV task. However, because the DNN was
adapted in the third phase to fit the enrollment speakers, it has
limitation for real world scenarios. In addition, because the per-
formance was reported using self-configured trials, it is difficult
to compare the EER.
In this study, we first propose an E2E framework, illustrated
in Figure 1-(a), that extends the work of Li et. al. [16, 17] in
two aspects. First, we adopt a single phase training approach
by using three loss functions for SID, PAD, and ISV. Second,
our framework directly outputs a spoofing-aware score without
using a separate back-end system.
3. Integrated speaker verification
In this section, we describe the proposed two frameworks for
conducting speaker verification that are aware of replay spoof-
ing attacks as shown in Figure 1.
3.1. End-to-end monolithic approach
We first propose an E2E monolithic approach. This architecture
simultaneously trains all components, including SID, PAD, and
ISV, using a common feature, as illustrated in Figure 1-(a). The
loss function for training the proposed E2E architecture com-
prises three components: a categorical cross-entropy (CCE) loss
for SID, a binary cross-entropy (BCE) loss for PAD, and a two-
class BCE loss for ISV. When a mini-batch is input for training,
the proposed system first conducts SID and PAD with an MTL
framework. Then, it composes a number of trials. A trial con-
sists of two embeddings, one for enroll, and the other for test.
The ISV prediction is made by feed-forwarding the two embed-
dings through a few fully-connected layers. The entire DNN
is jointly optimized using the sum of three loss functions. The
objective function Loss is defined as follows:
Loss = LossSID + LossPAD + LossISV (1)
where LossSID refers to the CCE loss for SID, LossPAD is
the BCE loss for PAD, and LossISV denotes the CCE loss of
ISV.
However, we found consistent tendencies that it is difficult
to extract a common representation, i.e. feature, for perform-
ing both SV and PAD tasks through experiments. Therefore,
we hypothesize that, although SV and PAD tasks are closely re-
lated in the scenario, the discriminative information required for
each task collides. Speaker embeddings for the SV task requires
robustness to device and channel difference; meanwhile, repre-
sentation for the PAD task uses such information [20]. Also,
both bona-fide and replayed utterances include the same speaker
(a)
(b)
Figure 2: Histograms of score distribution on the evaluation
trials. (a): SV baseline where score is calculated using cosine
similarity of two speaker embeddings. (b): The proposed mod-
ular system where three types of trials have three different dis-
tributions.
information, making it a less discriminative factor for the PAD
task; meanwhile, it is key information for the SV task. The
study of Sahidullah et. al. [13] supports our hypothesize, which
analyzes that the SV and PAD tasks should exist independently.
To validate our hypothesis, we address experiments using sep-
arately trained SV and PAD systems and MTL-based systems.
We further detail these elements in Section 4.3.
3.2. Back-end modular approach
We also propose a novel modular approach using a separate
DNN that take speaker embeddings and PAD predictions as in-
put to make an ISV decision. Figure 1-(b) illustrates our sec-
ond proposed system. We use LCNN architecture [21] to ex-
tract both speaker embeddings and spoofing predictions; this
choice is based on its success in various spoofing detection stud-
ies [11, 22].
Based on the hypothesis addressed in the previous subsec-
tion, we design an integrated system using a two-phase ap-
proach. In the first phase, we separately train an SID system
to extract speaker embeddings from the last hidden layer and a
PAD system to extract a spoofing prediction. Then, we train the
ISV system by using two speaker embeddings (one for enroll
and the other for test) extracted from the SID system as a pair
and a PAD label as an input. This system has a output layer with
two nodes: the first node indicates “acceptance and the second
node indicates “rejection’ for both ZE and replay trials.
In Figure 1-(b), the part trained in phase 2 is the pro-
posed back-end ISV system. It takes two speaker embeddings
and multiplication of the two embeddings as input and a mod-
ule of four fully-connected layers outputs a scalar that indi-
cates whether they are uttered by the same speaker. The fully-
connected layers comprise 256 nodes each and an output layer
comprise one node with a sigmoid function.
Next, the SV and PAD prediction results, and their mul-
tiplication are fed to a fully-connected layer to make the final
decision. In an ideal scenario, the multiplication of the SV re-
sult and PAD prediction would indicate 1 when both SV and
PAD are positive and 0 otherwise; we assume this multiplica-
tion would additionally inform the final decision. The objective
function Lossint for the back-end modular approach comprises
loss for the SV task and the loss for the final decision, defined
as:
Lossint = α · LossSV + LossISV (2)
where LossSV and LossISV refer to the BCE loss of the SV
task and the CCE loss of the ISV task, respectively, and α sig-
nifies the weight for the SV loss. We note that training the pro-
posed back-end DNN with only LossISV results in overfitting.
Based on a number of experiments that we omit for sake
of brevity, we found two key components that made our pro-
posed back-end DNN framework successful. First, we model
ZE and replay trials into separate score distributions. Figures
2-(a) and (b) respectively illustrate the score distributions of the
evaluation trials of the SV baseline and the proposed modular
back-end DNN. In Figure 2-(a), the score refers to the cosine
similarity of the two embeddings. Here, the score distribution
of replay non-target trials severely overlaps with that of target
trials. In our analysis, this results from embeddings that only
considered speaker information in which replayed and bona-
fide utterances coincided. In various experiments, it was im-
possible to model both replay and ze non-target trials into the
same score distribution. When one kind of non-target trial was
successfully modeled, the other resulted in a distribution sim-
ilar to uniform. Therefore, we aim to separate two non-target
score distributions, specifically by modelling the score distribu-
tion of ze non-target to have mean 0.5 and replay non-target to
have zero mean. To do so, we sequentially apply rectified linear
unit (ReLU) and sigmoid activation functions to the output of
SV, before the last hidden layer for ISV. Figure 2-(b) demon-
strates the score distribution of the proposed method. The re-
sults demonstrate that three types of evaluation trials are mod-
eled as intended (i.e. well generalized) in case of evaluation
trials although these trials comprise unknown speakers and re-
play conditions.
Second, we use actual PAD labels instead of PAD predic-
tions of the spoofing DNN in the training phase. It is based on
empirical comparisons in which the use of PAD predictions in
the training phase worsened performance. In our analysis, using
PAD labels in the training phase was more helpful because even
a small number of misclassified utterances among PAD predic-
tions can interrupt the training of the proposed DNN. Notably,
we empirically observed model collapse when training the pro-
posed modular DNN using PAD predictions.
4. Experiments & results
4.1. Dataset
All experiments in this study were conducted using the
ASVspoof2017-v2 dataset [23].2 To evaluate the proposed in-
tegrated systems, we used the trials reported in [12]. We used
training and development sets to train all systems comprising
2267 bona-fide and 2457 replay spoofed utterances from 18
speakers. To evaluate speaker verification and spoofing detec-
tion performances, we measured the ZE-EER and the PAD-EER
using the ASVspoof2017 joint PAD+ASV evaluation trial. This
trial comprised 1106 target, 18624 ze, and 10878 replayed tri-
als. We use target & ze for ZE-EER and target & replayed for
PAD-EER evaluations.
2For the ASVspoof2019 dataset, official trials do not exist for inte-
grated systems
Table 3: Results of various architectures using the proposed
monolithic E2E framework for the ISV task.
System ZE-EER (SV) PAD-EER Int-EER
#1 18.52 15.73 18.44
#2-SE 18.99 15.90 17.90
#3-split 19.43 37.31 26.40
Table 4: Experimental results showing that the required dis-
criminative information differs for SV and PAD (Sid: speaker
identification, PAD: replay spoofing detection, Int: integrated
speaker verification).
Train loss DNN arch ZE-EER (SV) PAD-EER
Sid SV 9.58 -
Sid+PAD SV 17.53 13.69
PAD PAD - 10.60
PAD+Sid PAD 19.16 12.17
4.2. Experimental configurations
We used PyTorch, a Python deep learning library, for all ex-
periments. For all DNNs, we input 64-dimensional Mel-
filterbank features with utterance-level mean normalization fol-
lowing [20]. We applied weight decay with λ = 1e−4, and
optimized with an AMSGrad optimizer [24].
Regarding our use of ASVspoof2017-v2, we found that rel-
atively thin LCNN structures were helpful for performance im-
provement; this may have been a result of the small size of
the dataset. In addition, we also found that minute changes in
DNN greatly influence the performance because of the small
data scale, therefore, a relatively thin structure remained partic-
ularly helpful for performance improvement. To derive a value
between 0 and 1 for the PAD task, we used a network archi-
tecture identical to that of [11] but replaced the angular margin
softmax activation [25] with a sigmoid function. We also mod-
ified the architecture for the SV task based on [11]. Speaker
embeddings had a dimensionality of 1024.
4.3. Results analysis
Table 3 describes the results of the proposed E2E framework
with a monolithic approach. System #1 refers to the proposed
architecture that jointly optimizes SID, PAD, and ISV loss, Fig-
ure 1-(a). System #2-SE is the result of applying squeeze-
excitation (SE) [26] based on its recent application to PAD [9].
System #3 describes the result of assigning three max feature
map (MFM) blocks [21] for SID as well as for PAD after the
first three MFM blocks. Because most of the systems perfor-
mance measures deteriorated compared to the SV baseline, we
concluded that the monolithic E2E approach was not ideal for
the ISV task. While the results of the experiments were differ-
ent from what we expected, they nevertheless serve as a spring-
board for establishing a new hypothesis.
Table 4 addresses the validation of our hypothesis in Sec-
tion 3 that the discriminative information for the SV and the
PAD task are distinct based on the results of Table 3. To vali-
date our hypothesis, we trained our SV and PAD baselines with
and without additional loss for extracting common embeddings.
Here, the first and third rows refer to the SV and PAD base-
lines and the second and fourth rows refer to the usage of the
Table 5: Results of the proposed modular approach for the ISV
task
System ZE-EER (SV) PAD-EER Int-EER
#4-w/o mul 20.52 19.77 20.48
#5-w mul 15.59 18.06 16.66
#6-loss weight 15.22 14.55 15.91
#7-DNN arch 14.32 15.46 15.63
Table 6: Comparison of the SV baseline, our proposed modular
DNN, and other work using the official trials for the ISV task.
ZE-EER PAD-EER Int-EER
SV Baseline 9.58 33.72 19.98
#7-Ours 14.32 15.46 15.63
Todisco et. al. [12] 4.71 18.11 -
MTL framework. The results demonstrate that, in both base-
lines, additionally adopting another loss function degraded per-
formance.
Table 5 summarizes the results of performance improve-
ment across various attempts to improve the performance of the
proposed method in the back-end modular approach. The com-
parison of Systems #4 and #5 shows the effectiveness of using
multiplication of the SV result and PAD prediction for the ISV
task. System #6 refers to the result of setting weights to the SV
task in the training phase where we set the α to 20. System #7
shows the result of reducing the number of nodes per hidden
layer.
Finally, Table 6 compares our proposed modular approach
with the SV baseline and existing work [12] using official tri-
als. The results demonstrate that the proposed approach stabi-
lizes unbalanced performance between ZE-EER and PAD-EER.
Compared with the SV baseline, which does not consider PAD
attacks, we achieved a relative improvement of 21.77%. Impor-
tant to note here is that we were unable to compare the Int-EER
with that of Todisco et. al. [12], although it is the only study that
reported performance using official trials. Because it proposed
a unified threshold for conducting SV and PAD tasks, Int-EER
results using the full trial does not exist.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the integration of speaker verifica-
tion and replay spoofing detection. We proposed two methods
for their integration: an E2E monolithic approach and a back-
end modular approach. The proposed E2E approach simultane-
ously trains SID, PAD, and ISV, using a common feature. The
experimental results of the E2E approach led us to hypothe-
size that the discriminative information for SID and PAD dif-
fers. Based on our hypothesis, we proposed a framework using
a separate back-end DNN that takes speaker embedding and a
PAD prediction extracted from pretrained SV and PAD systems
as input. The effectiveness of our proposed systems was veri-
fied using official trials for the ISV task where we achieved an
EER of 15.63%. It is expected that the proposed method will
continue to enhance performance when improved speaker em-
beddings and PAD prediction are input.
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